18. The Agency has been able to continue to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material in
Iran. Iran has provided the Agency with access to declared nuclear material and has provided the
required nuclear material accounting reports in connection with declared nuclear material and
activities. However, Iran has not implemented the modified text of its Subsidiary Arrangements
General Part, Code 3.1 on the early provision of design information. Nor has Iran implemented the
Additional Protocol, which is essential for the Agency to provide credible assurance about the absence
of undeclared nuclear material and activities.
19. Regrettably, as a result of the lack of cooperation by Iran in connection with the alleged studies
and other associated key remaining issues of serious concern, the Agency has not been able to make
substantive progress on these issues. For the Agency to make progress, an important first step, in
connection with the alleged studies, is for Iran to clarify the extent to which information contained in
the relevant documentation is factually correct and where, in its view, such information may have been
modified or relates to non-nuclear purposes. Iran needs to provide the Agency with substantive
information to support its statements and provide access to relevant documentation and individuals in
this regard. Unless Iran provides such transparency, and implements the Additional Protocol, the
Agency will not be able to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear
material and activities in Iran.
20. Contrary to the decisions of the Security Council, Iran has not suspended its enrichment related
activities, having continued the operation of PFEP and FEP and the installation of new cascades and
the operation of new generation centrifuges for test purposes. Iran has not provided access to the
IR-40, and, therefore, the Agency is not able to verify the current status of its construction.
21. The Director General continues to urge Iran to implement all measures required to build
confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of its nuclear programme at the earliest possible date.
22. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.
Duidelijk lijkt dat Iran wel meewerkt met inspecties, maar enkele projecten zijn niet te verifiëren. Echter nergens blijkt uit dat Iran dusdanig aan uranium-verrijking doet, dat er kernwapens mee kunnen worden gemaakt. Los daarvan is het eigenlijk van de zotte dat Iran überhaupt zich moet verantwoorden op dit punt, terwijl ondertussen aan beide kanten van het land zich nucleair bewapende naties bevinden die er geen been in zien om regelmatig een oorlog te voeren, te weten India, Israël en Pakistan. Drie landen die bovendien zich niet hebben geconformeerd aan het NPT, en zich bovendien in zeer volatiele politieke tijden bevinden.
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